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Abstract
Consider a population of customers each of which needs to decide independently when
to arrive to a facility that provides a service during a fixed period of time, say a day. This
is a common scenario in many service systems such as a bank, lunch at a cafeteria, music
concert, flight check-in and many others. High demand for service at a specific time leads to
congestion that comes at a cost, e.g., for waiting, earliness or tardiness. Queueing Theory
provides tools for the analysis of the waiting times and associated costs. If customers have
the option of deciding when to join the queue, they will face a decision dilemma of when to
arrive. The level of congestion one suffers from depends on others behavior and not only that
of the individual under consideration. This fact leads customers to make strategic decisions
regarding their time of arrival. In addition, multiple decision makers that affect each others
expected congestion, call for non-cooperative game theoretic analysis of this strategic inter-
action. This common daily scenario has prompted a research stream pioneered by the ?/M/1
model of Glazer and Hassin [12] that first characterized an arrival process to a queue as a
Nash equilibrium solution of a game. This survey provides an overview of the main results
and developments in the literature on queueing systems with strategic timing of arrivals.
Another issue is that of social optimality, namely the strategy profile used by customers that
optimizes their aggregate utility. In particular, we review results concerning the price of
anarchy (PoA), which is the ratio between the socially optimal and the equilibrium utilities.
Keywords: Strategic queueing; Transient queue; Bottleneck queue; Nash Equilibrium; So-
cial welfare; Price of Anarchy.
1 Introduction
The choice of when to join a congested service system is a common daily scenario for most
people. This is the case when a number of customers need to decide when to arrive to a bank
on a busy Monday. One can go early to ‘avoid the crowd’, perhaps even queueing before the
opening, but this entails waking up early. Another option is to arrive later in the day but then
the queue may be long and potentially being late for work. Another example is when passengers
who are booked for a 11pm flight need to decide when to arrive to the check-in counter, that
opens at 7pm. Imagine what will happen if all will follow the airline advice to arrive at least
three hours prior to boarding. Ideally, travelers want to arrive as late as possible, say at 10pm,
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but delaying the arrival for too long may lead to waiting a long time for the other travelers
that are already in the check-in queue. Also in this case there is a very big cost associated with
being too late, namely missing your flight. This tradeoff calls for strategic decision making by
all arriving customers. The game-theoretic concept of a Nash equilibrium provides a natural
model for this situation because it prescribes an arrival process such that the cost for all arriving
customers is constant over the relevant period. This survey provides an overview of the research
focusing on the modeling and analysis of queueing systems with the above strategic interaction.
Many queueing models assume an ongoing stream of joining customers whose number is
potentially infinite as time passes and therefore resulting in an queueing process ongoing process
with some steady-state distribution. However, temporal decision making requires a queueing
model with a finite number of customers and a finite time duration; we therefore consider a
finite population of customers that require service from a server that operates during a specified
time period. The customers individually decide when to arrive at the system, and if it is busy
they join a queue and wait for their turn to be served. As discussed above, the scenario of
a finite population of customers arriving and being served during a finite period is common
in queueing applications, however, it is less common in the theoretical analysis of queueing
systems. One key difference from standard queueing models is that the process is inherently
transient and the traditional steady-state analysis is not applicable. Another is that the arrival
process is endogenous in the sense that it is a function of the economic parameters associated
with the customers and, more crucially, of the strategic interaction which typically yields a non-
homogeneous in time arrival process with dependent arrival epochs, i.e., not a renewal process.
This process stems from the order statistics of the individual arrival-time decisions.
We first provide a general model description that will enable using, as much as possible, the
same consistent notation throughout the paper, rather than the specific notations used in the
discussed papers. Suppose a population of N <∞ customers require service, whereN could be a
constant, random variable or even a fluid volume. Each customer i has a service requirement Xi
and for now we assume that customers are statistically homogeneous; the service requirements
are independent and identically distributed random variables. Customers can arrive during an
admission period T that can be a continuous interval, e.g., [0, T ] or (−∞,∞), or a discrete
grid {t0, t1, . . .}. Services are provided by a single server or a number of servers that operate
during some time interval S. For example S = (−∞,∞) is a system that is always “on” like
a road and S = [0, T ] is a system with opening and closing times such as a bank. In some
cases queueing may also be allowed before service period initiation and/or service may continue
after the admission period ends. Customer i can choose his/her arrival time τi and so a mixed
strategy defines a probability distribution on T with cdf Fi. Customers wish to minimize the
expectation of a cost function Ci(τ1, . . . , τN ; Θ) that depends on the random arrival times of all
other customers and a set of parameters Θ such as service rate and delay penalty. Naturally,
customer i has discretion only over τi and does not know the realization of τ−i (the set of
arrival times of customers excluding i), let alone having control on it. The specific form of the
function is determined by the specific queueing system parameters, e.g., number of servers or
service discipline, together with the distribution of the arrival process which is determined by
the arrival strategies applied by all customers.
A Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies τi ∼ Fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , such that any customer i
obtains a minimal expected cost Fi ∈ argminF E[Ci(τ1, . . . τ, . . . , τN )], where τ induces distri-
bution F . The majority of the research is focused on homogeneous customers and symmetric
equilibrium solutions such that all customers use the same arrival strategy F . In many cases
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symmetric equilibrium is the only possible outcome and in some sense it is a natural solution
concept to adopt when the population is large and anonymous as it does not require identifica-
tion of individual customers. However, we will mention some cases where asymmetric equilibria
exist, even when customers are homogeneous.
Any strategic profile used by customers results in some social cost which is defined as the
sum of the costs suffered by the individual participants. It is natural to look for a profile which
minimizes this cost. This criterion is different than the Nash equilibrium criterion, which usually
leads to higher costs. The ratio between the corresponding costs, or the worst case in case the
Nash equilibrium is not unique, is called the price of anarchy (PoA).
We will first present two simple examples that illustrate some of the basic properties of the
equilibrium and the socially optimal solutions.
Example 1. Our first example and the pioneering model of this field is the ?/M/1 model
introduced by Glazer and Hassin in [12]. The population size N is assumed to follow a Poisson
distribution with mean λ. The service times are independent and exponentially distributed with
rate µ, and service is obtained from a single server that admits customers during a specified
period of time [0, T ]. Customers are served on a first come first served basis and can queue up
before the opening time, i.e., T = (−∞, T ]. All customers that arrive up to, and including, time
T are served (S = [0,∞)), in other words the server will continue working after T , if needed,
until the system is empty. The objective of the customers is to minimize their sojourn time in
the system. If all customers arrive according to a symmetric continuous arrival strategy F with
density f on an interval [ta, T ], then the arrival process to the queue A(t) is a non-homogeneous
in time Poisson process with rate λ(t) = λf(t). Therefore, in this case the queueing process is an
Mt/M/1. Interestingly, under reasonable axiomatic assumptions, a singled out arriving customer
believes that the number of other customers arriving follows the same distribution: Poisson with
mean λ. This is a special property of the Poisson distribution, but for general distributions
the conditional distribution of the number of other arriving customers can be derived in a
straightforward manner. We will elaborate in Section 2.2 on how a (prior) distribution on the
number of customers changes due to one’s becoming an actual customer.
In [12] it is shown that the Nash equilibrium arrival strategy is given by a uniform distribution
f(t) = c, where c > 0 is a constant, on t ∈ [ta, 0] where ta < 0, and a density f(t) that solves a
system of functional differential equations for t ∈ [0, T ]. We first provide here an outline of the
method for obtaining this solution, and later in Section 3 go into more detail for a generalization
of this model. The equilibrium condition dictates that the waiting cost equals some constant w
on [ta, T ], before the opening instant this condition translates to
E
[
A(t) + 1
µ
]
− t = w, t ∈ [ta, 0),
and after the opening to
E
[
Q(t) + 1
µ
]
= w, t ∈ [0, T ],
where A(t) is the number of arrivals until time t and where Q(t) denotes the number of customers
in the system at time t. The first condition is easily solvable because E[A(t)] = λF (t), while the
second already entails considering the dynamics of the queueing process Q(t). This can be done
by considering the transient state probabilities given by the Kolmogorov backward equations.
In principle, the above can be solved for any ta, where ta can be found by a search procedure
with termination condition F (T ) = 1.
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From a social welfare point of view, the equilibrium outcome is clearly not optimal. This is
because a positive mass of customers arrive before the opening and wait while the server is not
doing any work. Any such arrival profile can be improved by moving this mass to time zero,
i.e., setting F˜ (t) = 0 for any t < 0 and a point mass at t = 0: F˜ (0) = F (0). Indeed, Hassin and
Kleiner [19] show that the socially optimal strategy has a positive mass at zero, followed by a
continuous distribution on (0, T ) and a positive mass at T . We will discuss the details of social
optimization in Section 4. ♦
Finding the symmetric equilibrium arrival distribution F for different settings is the goal of
most of the literature discussed in this survey. As already is evident in the ?/M/1 example, this,
at least numerically, is typically not a trivial task. The issues of existence and uniqueness of
Nash equilibria need to be dealt with carefully and also devising reasonable methods for numer-
ically approximating the equilibrium is often challenging. The combination of transient analysis
together with elaborate time and service-regime dependence, makes each model challenging in
a unique way and calls for specialized solutions, and there is still much work to be done for
better understanding of these models. The following example presents a special case where F
can be explicitly derived for a game with just two customers. This example further illustrates
that asymmetric equilibria may exist as well.
Example 2. Two customers seek independent and exponentially distributed service with pa-
rameter µ from a server who opens his service at time 0. Customers have to select an arrival
time which needs to be in the interval T = [0, T ]. Note that each will complete his service
even it goes beyondtime T , i.e., S = [0,∞). Both wish to minimize their own waiting time,
assuming the service regime of first-come first-served and ties are broken randomly. Suppose
customer 1 arrives at time 0, then it is easy to verify that arriving at T is optimal for customer
2 if T ≥ log 2/µ. Therefore, in this case an asymmetric equilibrium comes with one of them
arriving at time 0 and the other at time T , and hence two pure equilibria exist. For T > log 2/µ
an additional symmetric equilibrium exists such that both customers use the following mixed
strategy: arrive at time 0 with probability 2/(2+µT − log 2), no arrivals during the time interval
(0, log 2/µ), and a uniform density along the time interval [log 2/µ, T ]. If T < log 2/µ then both
arriving at time 0 is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
The socially optimal solution is trivially obtained by one customer arriving at 0 and the
other at T . The social cost in this case is e−µT /µ. Thererfore, if T ≥ log 2/µ the pure strategy
equilibria described above are also socially optimal. The social cost for the symmetric equilibrium
for both customers arriving at 0 is 1/µ and for the symmetric mixed equilibrium detailed above
it is (µ(2 + µT − log 2))−1. In both of the latter cases the social cost in equilibrium is strictly
higher than the optimal cost. More details on this can be found in [26]. ♦
1.1 Paper organization
This survey is organized as follows. Firstly, Section 2 provides an in depth discussion of the
model. Specifically, Section 2.1 introduces the queueing model associated with a finite population
of customers randomizing their arrival times independently. Section 2.2 provides the assump-
tions and definitions required for analysing a game with a random population of customers, and
in particular the significance of assuming that the size of the population is a Poisson random
variable. Section 2.3 defines the game of timing arrivals and the concept of a Nash equilibrium
arrival profile and how it relates to the queue dynamics. Section 3 reviews the main results
regarding the Nash equilibrium solutions for various models. Moreover, the methods for compu-
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tation of the equilibrium are reviewed along with the difficulties that arise when moving away
from the FCFS single server model. Section 4 surveys the issue of system optimization, which
complements the equilibrium analysis of the previous section, along with results about the Price
of Anarchy. Section 5 deals with fluid approximation models. As opposed to the stochastic
queue, explicit results regarding equilibrium and social optimization are often attainable, even
for complex systems. A concluding discussion with reference to open problems is given in Section
6.
1.2 Related literature
An introduction to basic Queueing Theory that covers the tools required for most of the work
described in this survey can be found (among many other books) in Haviv [20] or Harchol-
Balter [15], and a more mathematical introduction can be found in Asmussen [1].
The study of strategic decision making in queueing systems goes back to the celebrated Naor
model [41] who was the first to analyze the decision of whether or not to join a queue from
an economic perspective. There are many economic considerations in the analysis of queueing
systems, such as joining or balking, purchasing priority, optimal pricing and scheduling and many
more. A detailed introduction to strategic queueing can be found in Hassin and Haviv [18]. A
comprehensive bibliography of this line of research is detailed in Hassin [17], with a special focus
on temporal decisions in queueing systems in Chapter 4.1. A related model was studied by
Haviv et al. [22] were customers know their time of arrival and should decide whether to join or
not. The analysis requires computing the transient dynamics corresponding to every strategy
profile used by other customers, which is also the case in the ?/M/1 model, but ultimately the
action of the customer is to either join or not, and this leads to a simpler analysis of the best
response function.
The choice of individual arrival time of travelers to a congested bottleneck has been ex-
tensively studied in the transportation literature. This goes back to the celebrated Vickrey
bottleneck model [56] that considers the ‘rush hour’ problem of commuters that need to choose
when to start their journey to work while taking into consideration delay, earliness and tardi-
ness costs. This model, as well as most of the subsequent literature, assumes a deterministic
fluid model that approximates a system with a large volume of users each having a very small
impact on overall congestion. Vickrey’s model has been extended and generalized extensively,
with Arnott et al. [4] being a notable example, and a review of this literature can be found in
Chapter 11 of [11]. Due to the simpler dynamics, such fluid models have also been frequently
used for approximating equilibrium arrival patterns to discrete and stochastic queueing systems.
As mentioned above we will discuss the accuracy and applications of such approximations in
Section 5 of this survey.
2 Modelling the queue and game
We now elaborate on the general model and highlight some of its important features. We first
deal with the queueing process arising from a finite population of customers with independent
arrival times. This is followed by discussing the implication of a random population size on the
formulation of a non-cooperative game and then a formal definition of a Nash equilibrium for
the queueing game.
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2.1 The queue
The population size is a random variable N such that P(0 < N < ∞) = 1, and given N = n,
the service demands of the n customers are iid random variables (X1, . . . ,Xn). Conditioning on
N = n, the arrival times of customers are n independent random variables (τ1 . . . , τn) that are
possibly not identically distributed. The random arrival time τi ∈ T , with T ⊆ R denoting the
admission interval, will later correspond to a strategy played by customer i which can also be
represented by the cdf Fi. The system processes work during some specified time interval S ⊆ R.
We say that the arrival times are symmetric if Fi = F for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , for some cdf F . The
above assumptions on arrivals and service hold for all papers discussed in this survey. However,
for now we do not assume a specific number of servers or service regime. Of course, the specific
attributes, along with the arrival and service distributions, will determine the distribution of
the waiting and departure times (i.e., service completion times) of every customer i, Wi and Di,
respectively, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
The arrival process to a queue is typically modeled as a renewal process: a sequence
(A1, A2, . . .) of iid random variables that represent the inter-arrivals times. For example, the
simplest model for arrivals is a Poisson process that assumes Ai are exponential random variables
with some fixed rate λ > 0. A comprehensive introduction to Renewal and Queueing Theory
can be found in [20]. However, when considering a model with a finite population that inde-
pendently choose arrival times, one must stray from the renewal framework. Suppose that the
arrival times of n customers are independent random variables (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn) with an identical
cdf F with support [0, T ]. Then the inter-arrival times are then given by
Ai = τ(i) − τ(i−1), i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where τ0 := 0 and τ(i) denotes the i’th order statistic of (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn). Clearly the sequence
(A1, A2, . . .) is neither independent nor identically distributed. In this case the arrival process
is the counting process
A(t) =
n∑
i=1
1{τ(i)≤t}, (2)
which is also known as the order statistic process. If τi are identically distributed then the order
statistic process is a Markov process (see [10]) but not a renewal process as explained above.
A special case is when the population size N follows a Poisson distribution. We denote the
corresponding mean by λ. If, in addition, the arrival times of the participating individuals are
independent and uniformly distributed along [0, T ], then the arrival process is a Poisson process
with rate λ/T , which is of course a renewal process. If the population size is Poisson but the
arrival distribution is not uniform, but some other symmetric cdf Fi = F for all i ≥ 1, then the
resulting arrival process is a non-homogeneous in time Poisson process as in Example 1. Note
that the non-homogeneous Poisson process has independent (but not identically distributed)
increments and hence it is not a renewal process.
A general framework for analyzing such a queueing model was given by Honnoppa et. al [28]
that introduced the ∆i/G/1 model. They assume a deterministic population N = n, general
service times with CDF G, and a single server that operates on a FCFS basis. Using our
notation ∆i = Ai are the inter-arrival times that are determined by the order statistic process
of the arrival times (τi)
n
i=1 as in (1). A discrete-time version of this queue is analyzed in [39].
For simplicity we now assume that T ⊆ S = [0,∞) and so work is processed as soon as
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customers start arriving. Therefore, the workload at time t is given by
W (t) =
A(t)∑
i=0
Xi −
∫ t
0
1{W (u)>0} du, t ∈ S, (3)
and the queue length at time t is
Q(t) = A(t)− S
(∫ t
0
1{Q(u)>0} du
)
, t ∈ S, (4)
where S(t) is the service process (counts the number of service completions during a period of
continuous work). Note that the workload represents the waiting time of a potential customer
arriving at time t (regardless if one arrives at this instant or not). If the admission period starts
before the service period, then there can be a period when the workload builds up with no work
being processed, and then the queueing dynamics in (3) and (4) need to be modified accordingly.
We will specify these dynamics in the special cases presented in Section 3.
The transient analysis of the queue length process Q(t) is generally intractable and so [28]
provides fluid and diffusion limits for the queueing process as n→∞, with appropriate scaling
of the service time distribution. These limits can provide an approximation for the transient
queue dynamics for systems with a large population of customers each having a minuscule service
demand. The fluid limit is especially useful because it enables explicit derivation of the Nash
equilibrium arrival strategies in several of the models we will discuss in Section 3.
If we make an additional assumption that service times are memoryless; Xi ∼ exp(µ) for
all i ≥ 1, then the system can be described by a constructing an appropriate continuous-time
Markov chain. This construction was first introduced in the ?/M/1 of [12] and generalized
by Juneja and Shmkin in [32] and subsequently used in many papers. First assume that the
population size is deterministicN = n and that the arrival times τi are continuous and symmetric
with cdf F , density f and hazard rate h(t) := f(t)1−F (t) . The process (Q(t), A(t)), indicating the
queue length at time t and the number of arrivals until t, is a continuous-time Markov chain.
Specifically, this process satisfies the Kolmogorov backward equations
d
dt
p0,j(t) = µp1,j(t)− (n− j)h(t)p0,j(t), 0 ≤ j ≤ n,
d
dt
pi,j(t) = µpi+1,j(t) + (n− (j − 1))h(t)pi−1,j−1(t)− (µ+ (n− j)h(t))pi,j(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ N,
(5)
where pi,j(t) = P(Q(t) = i, A(t) = j) for 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n, and pi,j(t) = 0 otherwise. This
can be generalized to random N by defining the hazard rate after j arrivals as the conditional
expectation hj(t) = E[N − j|A(t) = j]
f(t)
1−F (t) . Similarly, the arrival rate can be modified to
heterogeneous arrival distribution Fi by conditioning on the subset of customers that have
arrived before time t.
Further observe that the service process S(t) is now a Poisson process, hence for symmetric
arrivals and a deterministic population n, (4) yields the expected queue length at time t
E[Q(t)] = E[A(t)] − µ
∫ t
0
P(Q(u) > 0) du = nF (t)− µ
∫ t
0

1−
n∑
j=0
p0,j(u)

 du. (6)
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This means that the expected queue length q(t) := E[Q(t)] and expected workload
w(t) := E[W (t)] = q(t)/µ,
can be evaluated by solving the backward equations (5) given the initial conditions p0,0(t) = 1.
2.2 The prior and posterior number of players
In the examples of Section 1, the symmetric equilibrium was based on the fact that each of
the players has the same assumption with respect to number of other players who participate
in the game. There is no issue when there is a deterministic number of N players: Each one
assumes that the number of other players is N − 1. But what about the case where this number
is random?
In a model that reflects reality we would like to think of a single lottery which decides on the
number of players. Moreover, based on the distribution of this lottery, each of those who in fact
were selected by chance to participant, assesses the number of others who were also selected.
We deal with this issue next, but would like to say upfront that this number (inclusive of the
selected player) needs to be uniquely distributed as the length-biased distribution of the one
that governs the lottery. The argument given here is borrowed from Haviv and Oz [25]. Indeed,
suppose there are m potential players. The number of actual participants is i with a probability
denoted by πi(m), 0 ≤ i ≤ m. Assume all m players are equally likely to be selected, so the
probability that a tagged player was actually selected, given a total of i, is i/m, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Hence, by Bayes’s rule, the probability that size i was selected given the tagged one was one of
them, equals
i
m
πi(m)∑∞
j=1
j
m
πj(m)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (7)
which is easily seen to equal iπi(m)/E(N(m)), where E(N(m)) is the expected number of par-
ticipants. All one needs to assume is that the limits πi ≡ limm→∞ πi(m), i ≥ 0, exist and define
a proper distribution. Likewise with respect to E(N) ≡ limm→∞ E(N(m)). So in the limit, the
ratios in (7) become
ℓi :=
iπi
E(N)
, i ≥ 1,
which are the length-biased probabilities. In this framework we have the following result for
games with a Poisson distributed population (see Haviv and Milchtaich [23]).
Proposition 1 The distribution of the population size N possesses the property that ℓi+1 = πi
for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} if and only if N is a Poisson random variable.
Proposition 1 states that the Poisson distribution is the unique distribution over the integers
for which the length-biased distribution is the same distribution as the original population size
with a shift of one. This extra one is the player who assesses the number of others who participate
in the game with one. Therefore, the Poisson assumption simplifies the analysis of games with
a random population size, although typically results can be generalized in a straightforward
manner by considering the length-biased distribution. Moreover, the Poisson assumption is also
attractive because it is a good approximation for the binomial distribution that represents a
large pool of customers that potentially join the game, each with a tiny probability. Finally, the
Poisson assumption implies the independent increment property, which greatly simplifies the
required analysis. Further properties of games with a Poisson distributed number of players are
analyzed in the economic literature and we refer interested readers to [38, 40].
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2.3 The game
With the queue dynamics and the posterior distribution of the population size at hand, we are
ready to define the non-cooperative game and the Nash equilibrium solution for such a game.
From now on we assume that N is the random number of customers joining the queue with
respect to the posterior distribution of a customer selected to play as in (7) , i.e., P(N = n) = ℓn,
n ≥ 1. Any customer i that has been drawn to play selects an arrival time ti ∈ T , 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
A strategy of customer i is given by a random variable τi with cdf Fi, and an arrival profile
F := {Fi, i = 1, 2, . . .} dictates the strategies of all customers. For any customer i we denote
the strategy profiles excluding i by F−i.
From the viewpoint of a tagged customer i the queue length Q−i(t) and his/her waiting
time W−i(t) associated with arriving at time t, are functions of the arrival process A−i(t) that
is determined by the arrival profile of all other customers F−i. Thus the expected delay and
cost computations are with respect to this process that excludes customer i from the system. If
customer i arrives at time t, he/she incurs a cost Ci(t;F−i,Θ), where Θ is a set of additional
parameters that determine the cost. Denote the expected cost for customer i when arriving at
time t by ci(t;F−i) := E[Ci(t;F−i,Θ)]. We next present an example of a cost function for a
Markovian queue with penalties on delay and tardiness (based on the results of Haviv [21] and
Juneja and Shimkin [32]).
Example 3. A gate to a single server queue is open during the time interval [0, T ], which we
call a day. The case T = ∞ is not ruled out. Customers are allowed to arrive before time 0
and the seniority of those we wish to do so, is kept. This is known as the ‘with early birds’
assumption. They must arrive before time T in order for their service to be granted (even if it
goes beyond time T ). Therefore, T = (−∞, T ] and S = [0,∞) in the general notation. Service
requirements follow an exponential distribution with parameter µ and the number of customers
who seek service during the day follows a Poisson distribution with parameter λ. Customer
suffer a waiting cost of α > 0 per unit of time in the queue and a tardiness cost of β > 0 per unit
of time from time zero to the time of their service commencement. Hence, the cost function of
customer i arriving at t and waiting for w > 0 units of time equals αw + βmax{t+ w, 0}. The
waiting time consists of the time spent waiting for other customers to be served, and in addition
if a customer arrives at t < 0, before service commences, then he/she has to wait these −t units
of time regardless of the queue length at time t. Hence, the expected cost is given by
ci(t;F−i) = (α+ β)E[Wi(t)] + βt1{t≥0} − αt1{t<0}. (8)
If there are n− 1 other customers with symmetric arrival strategies and service times are expo-
nential with rate µ then E[Wi(t)] = E[Qi(t)]/µ, where the expected queue length is given by (6)
(for a system with n− 1 customers). ⋄
Definition 1 A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile F = {Fi, i = 1, 2, . . .} such that for any
customer i there exists a constant ki satisfying
ci(t;F−i) = ki, ∀t ∈ σ(Fi),
ci(t;F−i) ≥ ki, ∀t ∈ T \σ(Fi),
where σ(Fi) ⊆ T is the support of Fi.
Definition 1 is explained as follows: an individual arrival strategy is optimal in the sense that
it is a best response to the strategies selected by the others, and in particular one is indifferent
between arriving at all time instants among which the equilibrium strategy is randomizing.
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We next refine the equilibrium definition to a symmetric strategy profile (when possible).
Most of the research in the when-to-arrive literature deals with symmetric equilibria, although
as we saw in Example 2, there are cases where asymmetric equilibria exist (even when the game
itself is symmetric). Symmetric equilibrium is arguably a more natural outcome for large and
anonymous games, and in many cases it is in fact the only possible solution.
Definition 2 A symmetric Nash equilibrium is a strategy F such that there exists a constant k
satisfying
c(t;F ) = k, ∀t ∈ σ(F ),
c(t;F ) ≥ k, ∀t ∈ T \σ(F ),
where c(t;F ) denotes the expected cost of any customer who arrives at time t when all others
are using strategy F whose support is σ(F ) ⊆ T .
For the sake of brevity, from now on we denote the expected cost by ci(t), or c(t) in the
symmetric case, while keeping in mind that the cost is always a function of the strategy profile.
By the above definition we conclude that ddtc(t) = 0 for all t ∈ σ(F ) is a condition to be obeyed
by a symmetric and continuous equilibrium arrival distribution F .
Notation: Throughout this paper we make use of the following notations: g′(t) = ddtg(t) for
any differentiable function g, x+ := max{x, 0} and g(t−) := lims↑t g(s).
3 Equilibrium arrival strategies
Since the publication of [12] the ?/M/1 model has been generalized and extended in many direc-
tions. We first describe in detail the equilibrium analysis of the model with waiting and tardiness
costs of Example 3 with the additional assumption of a Poisson population and exponential ser-
vice times. The results are due to [21] and [32]. We find this example a good representative
of the formulation and analysis done in many of the subsequent articles extending it or relying
on similar analysis. In [32] and some of the following papers this example is refered to as the
‘Concert Queueing Game’. Note that the original ?/M/1 model of [12] (and Example 1 here) is
a special case with only waiting costs, i.e., β = 0.
3.1 Equilibrium with waiting and tardiness costs (Example 3)
We recap the model assumptions briefly. A population of customers, whose size N is a Poisson
random variable with mean λ, seek service from a single FCFS server. The admission and service
periods are T = (−∞, T ] and S = [0,∞), respectively. We first consider the case ‘with early
birds’ where customers are allowed to arrive before time 0 while their seniority is kept, and later
also review the case ‘without early birds’ where customers are randomly ordered at the opening
instant and so there is no incentive to arrive at any time t < 0. Service requirements follow an
exponential distribution with parameter µ. Customer incur a waiting cost of α > 0 per unit
of time in the queue and a tardiness cost of β > 0 per unit of time from time zero until their
service commencement.
Customers decide on their arrival time, t, which needs to be in the time interval [−ta, tb] for
some (to be determined) ta ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ tb ≤ T . Their goal is to minimize their expected total
(waiting plus tardiness) costs given in (8). Since mixing is allowed (and in fact, needed) we
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seek a symmetric arrival strategy which states a CDF F (t) that constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Given a symmetric arrival strategy F , denote the expected queueing time for one who arrives
at time t by w(t). Then the expected cost associated with arriving at time t is given by (8),
c(t) = (α+ β)w(t) + βt1{t≥0} − αt1{t<0},
where w(t) = E[Q(t)]/µ. We make the following observations on the equilibrium distribution:
• No atoms: The equilibrium strategy F does not come with atoms. This is because
arriving momentarily before an atom ensures a lower expected queue length, i.e., if F (t)
has an upward discontinuity at t then so do E[Q(t)] and w(t). Hence, we look for a CDF
which comes with a density function f(t) such that F (t) =
∫ t
τ=−ta
f(τ) dτ , where f(τ) is
continuous almost everywhere.
• No holes: There are no gaps in the support of the arrival time distribution: If a gap
exists, one better arrive at its end rather than at it initiation. This is verified by taking
derivative of the cost function c(t) (see Lemma 2.1 of [21] for details).
Given the above properties, Definition 2 states that in equilibrium there exists some constant
k > 0,
(α+ β)w(t) + βt = k, t ∈ [−ta, tb], (9)
and
(α+ β)w(t) + βt ≥ k, t /∈ [−ta, tb]. (10)
The first thing to observe is that k = αta as this is the cost of one who arrives at time −ta and
faces an empty queue with probability one. Since,
w(t) =
E[Q(t)]
µ
=
λF (t)
µ
− t, −ta ≤ t < 0,
we have that
α
λF (t)
µ
− t+ β
λF (t)
µ
is constant along the time interval [−ta, 0]. Hence,
f(t) =
µ
λ
α
α+ β
, −ta ≤ t ≤ 0.
In particular, the distribution along the early birds arrival period is uniform. Therefore, F (0) =
taµα/(λ(α + β)) and ∫ tb
0
f(t) dt = 1− ta
µ
λ
α
α+ β
. (11)
Assume for now that T =∞. This assumption will be removed shortly.
Clearly, the density function f(t) determines the arrival process, which due to the Poisson
assumption regarding the number of arrivals during the day, is a non-homogeneous Poisson
process with a rate function λf(t). Moreover, the future progression of the number who queue
up at time t, which in turn determines the expected waiting time given an arrival at this instant,
does not depend on the past, once the current number in the system is given. Specifically, denote
by pi(t), the probability that at time t, t ≥ 0, the number in the system is i, i ≥ 0. Then,
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these probabilities obey the initial conditions, given by the splitting property of the Poisson
distribution,
pk(0) = e
−λF (0) (λF (0))
k
k!
, k ≥ 0 (12)
and the dynamics described in (5) are
p′0(t) = p1(t)µ− p0(t)λf(t), 0 < t < tb, (13)
p′k(t) = pk−1(t)λf(t) + pk+1(t)µ − pk(t)(λf(t) + µ), 0 < t < tb, k ≥ 1. (14)
The standard queue dynamics described in (6) yield
w′(t) =
1
µ
(λf(t)− µ(1− p0(t))).
This coupled with the equilibrium condition (9) turn out to be equivalent to
f(t) =


µ
λ
α
α+β , −ta ≤ t < 0,
(1−p0(t))µ
λ
− βµ(α+β)λ , 0 ≤ t ≤ tb.
(15)
Another equilibrium condition is that
f(tb) = 0, (16)
as without it one better arrive at time tb+, violating (10).
The above provides a full characterization of a symmetric equilibrium arrival distribution
but the complicated queueing dynamics do not enable an explicit solution of the functional
differential equations. We next describe a simple method for numerical computation of the
equilibrium distribution.
Algorithm 1: Numerical computation of the equilibrium strategy F .
Set k = 0 and guess t
(k)
a > 0.
(a) Compute f(t) for t < 0 and F (0) from (11) and then pk(0) using (12).
(b) Compute f(t) for t > 0 using (15), (13) and (14), stopping when tb satisfies (11).
If f(tb) > 0 then set t
(k+1)
a > t
(k)
a and repeat steps (a) and (b).
If f(tb) < 0 then set t
(k+1)
a < t
(k)
a and repeat steps (a) and (b).
If f(tb) = 0 then (16) is satisfied and F is the equilibrium distribution.
Of course, implementation of Algorithm 1 requires some more details. In practice, it is
convenient to do the computation on a discretized time grid and to use a smart bisection search
for finding ta quickly. The converegence of the algorithm to a unique solution is guaranteed by
monotonicity properties discussed in [21, 32]. It is further established in [32] that the symmetric
equilibrium solution here is the unique solution, even if asymmetric strategies are allowed. The
uniqueness result requires a technical assumption that mixed strategies with an infinite number
of atoms in a finite interval are not allowed.
One more feature we would like to report on the equilibrium density is that it comes with
a downwards discontinuity at t = 0; f(0−) > f(0). This phenomenon is repeated in other
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Figure 1: Example 3 (waiting and tardiness costs). The cdf and density of the Nash equilibrium
arrival distribution. The example parameters: (λ = 20, µ = 2, α = 1.2, β = 0.9).
when-to-arrive models. It is interesting that the equilibrium arrival rate drops as soon as the
server commences service.
Figure 1 illustrates the density and the cdf which determine the equilibrium arrival process.
In this example the parameters are (λ = 20, µ = 2, α = 1.2, β = 0.9). Customers start arriving
at ta = −10 and they arrive before the opening with a probability of F (0) = 0.59. After the
opening customers arrive with a decreasing to zero density until tb = 11.2. Recall that the
system may continue working after tb if there are still customers waiting for or at service at time
tb.
A final remark for this example is the analysis straightforwardly extends to any distribution
on the population size, N . As explained in Section 2.3, the dynamic equations (13) need to be
replaced by (5) for the two-dimensional process (A(t), Q(t)) representing the number of arrivals
and the queue length, respectively. In particular, the arrival rate at time t when A(t) = j
customers have already arrived is given by the hazard rate function
hj(t) = E[N − j|A(t) = j]
f(t)
1− F (t)
.
For any N = n the number of customers in the queue at t = 0 is a Binomial(n, F (0)) random
variable, hence the initial conditions of the system are now given by
pk(0) =
∞∑
n=1
ℓn
(
n
k
)
F (0)k(1− F (0))n−k, k ≥ 0,
where ℓn is the length-biased distribution defined in Section 2.2. If N is a constant then ℓN−1 = 1
for any tagged customer.
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3.2 Restrictions on arrival times
In Example 1, where only waiting costs (β = 0) were assumed, it was necessary to assume a finite
closing time T < ∞: otherwise customers could ‘spread’ their distribution over an unbounded
period leading to virtually zero interaction and no waiting costs. When tardiness costs exist as
well, then even without a restriction on the customers to arrive on a finite interval, the resulting
arrival period will be bounded. This is because the tardiness cost is unbounded for arriving very
late. However, one may still want to consider a system with a closing time and tardiness costs
and the analysis in Section 3.1 still holds with a slight modification. It is clear that if T < ∞
but still T > tb, then the equilibrium distribution remains the same. Otherwise, tb needs to be
replaced by T throughout the analysis (removing one degree of freedom from the solution) and
the equilibrium condition (16) needs to be removed. For further details on the construction of
the equilibrium in this case we refer to [21].
Suppose now that early birds are not allowed and all customers present at the opening instant
are randomly ordered. This may be the case in a facility without a physical space to form a
queue before the gates are open, or in digital systems that are simply turned on at a certain
moment in time. The game with no early birds was first studied by Hassin and Kleiner [19] for
a model with only waiting costs and later extended to a model with waiting and tardiness costs
in [21]. In this case there is no reason for a customer to arrive at any t < 0 and the equilibrium
distribution is therefore restricted to [0, T ]. The key difference in the solution is that now there
is an atom at time zero whose size is F (0) > 0. Furthermore, as there is an upward discontinuity
in the waiting time immediately after the atom, there will be no arrivals along a positive interval
immediately after the opening. Formally, there exists some te > 0 such that F (te) = F (0) and∫ T
t=te
f(t) dt = 1−F (0). Note that it is possible that te = T , i.e., all customers arrive together at
the opening with probability one (as was shown in Example 2 for a game with two customers).
The density f(t) on [te, T ] is obtained in the same manner as was exemplified in the case without
early birds, with initial conditions that are given by (12), with F (0) as the boundary parameter
instead of ta. Therefore, Algorithm 1 can still be applied with little modification.
3.3 Computing the equilibrium
Explicit analysis and computation of the equilibrium distribution is impossible for most models
and so algorithmic and numerical approaches are often used. The most commonly used method
for computing the equilibrium is via a discrete approximation of the solution to the functional
differential equations arising from the equilibrium conditions together with the queueing dynam-
ics. We provide details on this approximation for the model with waiting and tardiness costs of
Example 3.
Suppose that early birds are not allowed and that the system has a finite closing time, i.e.,
T = [0, T ]. One can choose a small ∆ such that T/∆ is an integer and solve the game on a
discrete grid {0,∆, 2∆, . . . , T}. The population size, and therefore also the queue, is unbounded
due to the infinite support of the Poisson distribution and so a truncation of the state space is
in order. Namely, assume that the queue buffer is a large integer, denoted byM . The queue
dynamics of (13) and (14) are then approximated for every t ∈ {0,∆, 2∆, . . . , T} by
p0(t+∆) = p0(t) + ∆(p1(t)µ − p0(t)λf(t))
and
pk(t+∆) = pk(∆) +∆(pk−1(t)λf(t) + pk+1(t)µ − pk(t)(λf(t) + µ)), 1 ≤ k ≤M,
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where pM+1(t) := 0 for any t. This approximation is justified by recalling that one of the
definitions of a continuous-time Markov chain is that transitions from state i occur at time t
with probability of the order ∆qi(t) + o(∆), where qi(t) is the total transition rate from state i
at time t.
In Algorithm 1, for any initial value F (0), the probabilities pk(t) need to be evaluated
for all k ∈ {0, . . . ,M} and t ∈ {0, . . . , T}. We therefore conclude that a single iteration of
Algorithm 1 requires an order of M · T/∆ computations. For an arbitrary initial guess of F (0)
multiple iterations are typically required until convergence is reached, but typically the number
of iterations is small and the time consuming part of the algorithm are the iterations themselves.
IncreasingM or decreasing ∆ clearly improve the accuracy of the approximation but both come
at the cost of increasing the computation time of every iteration of the algorithm.
3.4 Cost functions
The existence and uniqueness of the symmetric Nash equilibrium is rigorously verified in [32] for
the game with early birds. As illustrated in Example 2, if early birds are not allowed and T <∞
there may exist multiple asymmetric equilibria where some customers arrive at time zero and
some at T . Excluding such cases, the underlying result is that the equilibrium dynamics given
by demanding the cost c(t) to be constant along the support and the backward equations of the
queueing processes yield a unique solution that is monotone with respect to initial conditions.
Breinbjerg [6] extends the existence and uniqueness result to a model with general (non
exponential) service times and a non-linear cost function. Specifically, a utility function that
is continuous and decreasing with respect to both waiting and departure times are assumed.
A constructive characterization of the symmetric equilibrium was provided and uniqueness was
argued by applying the aforementioned monotonicity properties of the equilibrium dynamics.
The construction of the equilibrium for general service times and non-linear utilities does not
provide a general tractable computational method, so specially tailored numerical methods for
the specific dynamics and cost structure need to be constructed for every model. An algorithm
for computing the Nash equilibrium in a discrete-time setting with general service times is
constructed by Sakuma et. al [50] for the model with no early birds and β = 0.
In Ravner [46] it is assumed that the customers incur a cost based on the order of admission.
This is the case for example in a concert hall or a bus with unassigned seats. Let γ > 0 denote
the linear order penalty, i.e., a customer arriving at time t incurs a cost of γA(t), where A(t)
is the number to appear by time t. Suppose that their additional tardiness and waiting costs
are as before, then the equilibrium has the same structure as in Example 3, with a modification
of the density function (15) that takes into account the additional cost parameter γ. The case
of T = ∞ and β = 0 is interesting because the equilibrium distribution has an infinite support
with a density that decreases exponentially fast to zero but never equals zero. Therefore, in this
case the arrival process can last for a very long time (with a positive probability): Even if one
arrives late (long after all other customers have arrived), the expected cost is approximately γN
because the queue is most likely empty. This further implies that in equilibrium the expected
cost for all customers is exactly γN . For the special case of N = 2 the equilibrium distribution
has an explicit solution which turns out to be an exponential distribution after time zero.
Some service systems are always operational and don’t have an opening time, but may still
be congested for only a specific time period. For example, the highway leading to a city is always
open but traffic jams occur mostly at rush hour when the demand for getting into the city is
highest. This is also the case for various digital systems such as streaming services with peak
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demand at certain hours. A natural model for such a system is presented by Sherzer and Kerner
in [51]: a finite population of N customers that can arrive any time t ∈ (−∞,∞), but now there
is also a penalty for arriving early. The costs are linear with β1, β2 and α denoting the per
unit of time earliness, tardiness and waiting costs, respectively. The ideal time for arriving and
starting service is assumed to be t = 0, without loss of generality. The expected total costs for
a tagged customer arriving at time t is then
c(t) =


−tβ1 + αw(t) + β2E
[
(t+
∑A(t)
i=1 Xi)
+
]
, t < 0,
(α+ β2)w(t) + β2t, t ≥ 0,
(17)
recalling that w(t) is the expected waiting time of one who arrives at time t and Xi is the service
time of customers i. Note that earliness is the (negative) deviation of the arrival time from zero
and tardiness is the deviation of the time of starting service from zero and therefore a customer
may arrive early and still incur a tardiness cost if their waiting time ends after zero. For a Poisson
population, using similar arguments as in Example 3, [51] provides a similar characterization of
a unique symmetric arrival distribution: F is continuous with a density that satisfies a system of
differential equations given by the queue dynamics and the constant expected cost equilibrium
condition. However, the equilibrium solution is harder to compute because the density before
zero is no longer uniform and the derivative of (17) is a function of the probabilities pk(t) of all
states k ≥ 0 and not just the idle probability p0(t) as in (15). The solution can be approximated
with a procedure similar to Algorithm 1.
An additional paper that assumes earliness costs is Glazer et. al [14] for a machine scheduling
motivated model. A single machine processes N determinsticly-sized jobs that have a desired
due date with penalties for tardiness and earliness, but no cost for waiting. It is shown that
multiple equilibria exist such that all jobs arrive at the same time. For most parameter settings
the socially optimal schedule is also an equilibrium. The above result holds for several extensions
such as heterogeneous jobs that may differ in their due dates or earliness/tardiness penalties.
3.5 Service regimes and queue dynamics
Timing of arrivals is also relevant for periodic batch-service systems, such as a bus or train that
departs at some known time. Such a model is studied in Glazer and Hassin [13]: service is
provided to a batch of up to N ≥ 1 customers every T > 0 units of time, and if there are more
than N customers waiting at the time of service then only the first N are served (with FCFS
order) and the remaining customers must wait for at least another T units of time until the
next service. Every period a Poisson number of customers joins the system and choose when
to arrive during [0, T ]. Note that the batch sizes are independent but the waiting times are
not as at the beginning of a period there may be customers left from previous periods. The
steady-state arrival distribution is shown to be a continuous distribution F on [te, T ] for some
te > 0 with a density f(t) that satisfies a system of backward equations, similar to those detailed
for Example 3 above.
Lariviere and Van Mieghem [35] consider a a discrete-time system with M customers that
choose between T possible arrival slots. Each time slot is assumed to be sufficient to serve all
arriving customers so there are no queue dynamics and the expected congested cost is based
only on the number of other customers with the same chosen time slot. The arrival process
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corresponding to the mixed Nash equilibrium is shown whenM and T grow large, to be approx-
imately a homogeneous in time Poisson process.
Suppose now that the system has a finite buffer and customers arriving when the buffer is full
are lost and do not obtain service. In Mazalov and Chuiko [37] a single server with exponentially
distributed service times and no waiting buffer is considered, i.e., an ?/M/1/1. The utility of
a customer arriving and finding the sever idle at time t is given by some continuous function
C(t), and the utility is zero if the customer finds the server busy and the customer is then lost.
The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is again given in the form of a continuous distribution
that solves a system of differential equations with some special cases admitting a closed form
solution. Haviv and Ravner [26] assume that customers wish to maximize the probability of
admission in a multi-server finite buffer queue ( ?/M/m/c system) by choosing an arrival time
t ∈ [0, T ]. As in the no early birds case of Section 3.2, the symmetric equilibrium strategy has
an atom at zero F (0) and a continuous distribution on an interval [te, T ]. If there is a single
server and no waiting buffer; m = c = 1, then the equilibrium distribution is uniform for the
special cases of N = 2 and N following a Poisson distribution. Note that for N = 2 this is
exactly Example 2. This is the case as there is only one other potential customer, we get that
minimizing waiting is equivalent to maximizing the probability of finding an idle server. The
model of [26] is extended by Chuiko [9] to a loss system with two servers and random routing.
A similar equilibrium distribution is derived by solving a more elaborate system of equations
that takes into account the transient joint distribution of the state of both servers.
So far we have discussed systems with FCFS policy. However, there are many systems that
employ other service regimes such as priority classes, processor sharing or last come first served
(LCFS). Such a policy may be in order for a system with heterogeneous customers or as a means
for improving performance. The queue dynamics become much more elaborate for non-FCFS
regimes, for example overtaking implies that the expected waiting time of a customer arriving
at t depends on arrivals after time t and so a recursive solution of the equilibrium dynamics as
in Algorithm 1 no longer works. Therefore, approximations of the equilibrium or of the system
dynamics are often used for studying such models. The most common approach is by applying
fluid approximations. This line of work will be discussed in detail in Section 5.
A classical result of Hassin [16] states that LCFS preemptive-resume policy is socially op-
timal for an observable queue with customers that can balk from the queue. Similar results
are obtained for the game of timing arrivals by Platz and Østerdal [44] and Breinbjerg and
Østerdal [7]. In particular, [44] establishes the optimality of the LCFS, and, interestingly, that
FCFS is the worst in a wide class of service regimes. This is done by considering a fluid ap-
proximation of the game. [7] constructs a numerical method to compute the equilibrium arrival
distribution for LCFS. It is further shown numerically that the social welfare in equilibrium is
higher for LCFS than FCFS. An additional model that is related to LCFS is the timeline game
of Altman and Shimkin [3]. This model considers a website with ad listings, such as real-estate
properties, where the newest ad bumps down all existing ads. The game takes place over a
finite duration [0, T ] and advertisers choose when to upload their ad with the goal that their
ad be placed as high as possible for as long as possible. It is shown there that the symmetric
equilibrium distribution is given by a continuous distribution on [0, te] for some te < T and is
derived by using similar equilibrium conditions as the ?/M/1 model.
An observable version of the when-to-arrive game is studied in Babaioff and Oren [5]. A
population of N customers choose when to arrive from a discrete set of times, T = {1, 2, . . .},
and customers arriving at the same time are randomly ordered. Before every unit of time all
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customers who have not joined can observe the queue and decide whether to join or wait. The
service time is deterministic and equals one unit of time for each customer. Customers wish to
minimize their waiting time in the queue. This setup yields a stochastic game and therefore the
solution concept analyzed is the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). It is shown by induction
that a symmetric SPE always exists. This is done by the construction of the discrete queue
dynamics and the evolution of the expected costs. If the waiting cost is low, specifically a linear
cost of α ≤ 2 per unit of time, then the equilibrium prescribes that all customers join in the first
period with probability 1. For α > 2 there exist more elaborate mixed strategies that randomize
between joining or not for several time periods. Of course, every such strategy dictates what
action to make for every queue length observed and therefore the equilibrium strategies can be
described algorithmically but not explicitly.
A model allowing for heterogeneous customers and priorities was introduced by Talak et. al
[54]. The paper studies the problem of when to arrive at the gate for boarding a plane. The
gate closes at t = 0 and so all customers must choose an arrival time t ≤ 0 and wait behind all
travelers who have already joined the queue, i.e., T = (−∞, 0] and S = {0}. It is assumed that
the cost of a customer is a weighted combination of the queueing time and penalty for arriving at
the gate −t units before boarding commences. The weight of the waiting time penalty, denoted
by nv, is determined by the type v, which is given by a continuous random variable from a
known common distribution. Customers decide when to arrive given their individual waiting
cost. The unique Nash equilibrium dictates a deterministic arrival time for each waiting penalty
realization. The paper considers several extensions and generalizations. A notable extension
allows customers to purchase priority, from a discrete set of L priority levels, as well as choosing
when to arrive. Under some assumptions it is shown that, in equilibrium, each priority level
ℓ = 1, . . . , L comes with an associated interval of customer types: every customer of type
v ∈ [vℓ, vℓ] purchases priority ℓ, and furthermore the customers at each level have disjoint arrival
intervals. Moreover, customers with a higher weight nv for the waiting penalty arrive later and
purchase higher priorities than those who have
In many queueing systems, such as those arising in traffic and communication networks,
the service regime is processor sharing rather than FCFS. As explained before, solving the
equilibrium dynamics for such a system is much harder even for a Markovian system because
the waiting time of a customer arriving at time t is determined by the number of customers in
the system at t and all those arriving after time t (and before the customer departs). A fluid
approximation for this model will be discussed in Section 5. In Ravner et. al [47], a Stackelberg
game of choosing arrival times to a deterministic processor sharing system is analyzed. Every
customer has a unit job size and an individual due date, and the cost is a weighted combination
of the sojourn time in the system and the deviation from the due date. The customers choose
the arrival times sequentially in the order of their due dates. It is shown that multiple subgame
perfect equilibria exist for this game. Furthermore, an iterative best-response algorithm for
computing equilibrium points is constructed.
The aforementioned [50] considers a discrete-time version of [19] (a FCFS system with no
early birds and penalty only for waiting) with general service times. The equilibrium distribution
are numerically compared to the outcome of a dynamic agent based learning model: A large
population of potential customers join the queue every day independently, each with some small
probability. If they indeed join, they need to choose when to arrive. Customers start by choosing
an arrival uniformly on the first day and record the waiting time experienced at the chosen
arrival time. As time evolves customer mix between arriving uniformly and choosing the time
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that yielded the minimal average waiting time in the past, with a growing probability for the
latter. The above exploration-exploitation dynamics converge to an empirical distribution that
is shown by means of simulation to be very close to the Nash equilibrium arrival distribution.
Intuitively, all the time slots that are chosen repeatedly in the long run yield the same waiting
time and therefore this approximates the equilibrium condition of a constant expected cost
over the support of the distribution. This type of learning dynamics can be a powerful tool
to approximate the equilibrium arrival distribution for more complicated systems which are
otherwise intractable. Ravner and Sakuma [49], extend this learning model to a system with
a random service rate and noisy signals. In particular, customers are heterogeneous due to
receiving different information about the service speed and computing the equilibrium becomes
a difficult task even for a simple model with two types of customers and exponential service
times. The long term outcome of the learning dynamics are shown to be quite differ from the
equilibrium outcome when customers have limited information about the system parameters.
4 Social optimality and Price of Anarchy
So far we have formulated the “when-to-arrive” problem as a non-cooperative game and the
solution concept we looked for is that on symmetric Nash equilibrium. Now we consider a dif-
ferent criterion, that of society. As elaborated in Section 2, the strategy profile T = {τ1, . . . , τn}
determines the random arrival process to the system. Given the arrival process every customer
i = 1, . . . , has some expected cost ci(T) and the social cost is defined as the sum of the individual
costs,
∑n
i=1 ci(T). Consider some symmetric (or for that matter, asymmetric) strategy profile
that associates a cost for each of the players. A socially optimal arrival profile is then
T∗ ∈ argmin
T
n∑
i=1
ci(T).
It is important to make a distinction between two levels of control the optimizer has over the
arrival times:
• Full control The individual arrival times (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ R
N of all customers can be selected
by a central planner. This means that all customers can be identified and instructed when
to arrive. In particular, symmetric customers can be told to arrive at different times. If
the population size N is random then its realization should also be known.
• Optimal symmetric strategy A single message can be sent to all customers instructing
them what, possibly mixed, strategy to use. This is an anonymous control. If customers
are heterogeneous in the sense that they belong to different classes, the message may
specify a different strategy for every type of customer. An assumption invoked here is that
customers know their own type.
The optimal full control schedule of arrivals can be seen as an upper bound on the social
welfare because no static policy can do better. The anonymous control, on the other hand, is
limited to solutions that can be implemented by the customers themselves without centralized
coordination. Customers are still anonymous but instead of a Nash equilibrium profile, the sym-
metric individual strategy is chosen in such a way that social welfare is maximized. Therefore,
the latter is a more natural benchmark for the equilibrium social welfare because it maintains
the rules of the game.
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The inefficiency of the system is typically measured by the Price of Anarchy (PoA) , which
is the ratio between the worst equilibrium cost and the socially optimal cost,
PoA =
supTe∈T e
∑n
i=1 ci(T
e)∑n
i=1 ci(T
∗)
≥ 1,
where T e is the set of all Nash equilibria. In most cases T∗ is the optimal symmetric control,
but in some cases the full control optimal solution is easier to compute and then taking T ∗ as
this solution can be viewed as an upper bound on the PoA.
Example 2 (cont.) Recall that two customers seek service from a single service and choose
when to arrive during the time interval [0, T ]. Service times are exponential with rate λ. We
next detail the equilibrium, full control and anonymous control solutions.
• Symmetric equilibrium If T < log 2/µ then both customers arrive at t = 0. If T >
log 2/µ then the symmetric equilibrium strategy is given by F e(0) = 2/(2+µT − log 2) and
a uniform density of µ/(2+µT − log 2) along the interval [log 2/µ, T ]. Note that the above
ignores the possible asymmetric equilibria discussed in Section 1. If both customers arrive
at 0 the social cost is 1/µ and for the symmetric mixed equilibrium it is 4/µ(2+µT−log 2).
• Optimal Symmetric strategy If we limit the profiles to symmetric ones, it is shown
by Haviv and Oz [24] that the (practically) unique optimal solution is to arrive with
probability
F ∗(0) = F ∗(T )− F ∗(T−) = 1/(2 + µT )
at either time 0 or time T , and with a uniform density of µ/(µT + 2) along the inter-
val (0, T ). It is possible to show that the social cost equals 2/(2 + µT )µ.
• Full control The optimal social welfare for asymmetric strategies is obtained by one
customer arriving at time 0 while the other arrives at time T . The social cost is e−µT /µ.
We can use the above to compute the PoA with respect to the optimal symmetric strategy:
PoA =


1 + µT2 , T < log 2/µ,
2(2+µT )
2+µT−log 2 , T > log 2/µ.
Similarly, the PoA bound corresponding to the full control solution can be derived. Interestingly,
it is shown in [24] that the symmetric equilibrium strategy under the processor-sharing regime
coincides with the socially optimal symmetric strategy. This result does not extend to the case
of more than two customers seeking service along the time interval [0, T ]. ♦
Going beyond the simple case of two customers there is little hope for finding explicit solu-
tions, as was the case for the equilibrium analysis. Therefore, the majority of research on social
welfare optimization relies on algorithmic methods and approximations. For the ?/M/1 queue
with only waiting costs and T = [0, T ] [19] use a local search method on a discretized time grid
to approximate the optimal symmetric arrival strategy. The approximated optimal symmetric
strategy is quite intuitive: a mass of customers should arrive at the opening, a mass at closing
and almost uniformly along (0, T ). It was further shown numerically that the gain in social
welfare by not allowing early birds is very small for a system that is not very heavily loaded.
The methodology of [19] relies on techniques used in outpatient scheduling, namely optimization
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of multimodular functions. See Altman et. al [2] for theoretical background and Kaandorp and
Koole [34] for the application to outpatient scheduling.
In the observable model of [5] some interesting asymptotic properties of the PoA are estab-
lished. For the full control benchmark it is shown that the PoA approaches 2 as the population
size or waiting cost increases to infinity. When the PoA is defined with the optimal symmetric
strategy then the same result holds for the population size only. The PoA approaches a much
lower number (≈ 1.06) when the waiting cost increases to infinity.
The task of optimal scheduling or sequencing of jobs has naturally received a lot of attention
in the operations research literature (see Pinedo [42] for an extensive introduction to the topic)
and some of these methods are also useful for the when-to-arrive model. Choosing the socially
optimal arrival times (full control) for a singe server with exponential service is shown to be a
convex problem in Pegden and Rosenshine [43], when the objective is minimizing a weighted
combination of expected waiting times and makespan. Hence, finding the optimal schedule
can be achieved efficiently using standard methods such as gradient descent. However, for more
elaborate systems the objective function is non-convex and sometimes it is hard to even evaluate
the cost for a given schedule. Thus, heuristic methods are often used. One such heuristic is the
equidistant schedule of arrivals spread out on [0, T ] (see, for example, Stein and Coˆte´ [52]). This
heuristic has a solid intuition behind it that a social planner would like to spread arrivals as far
as possible apart in order to avoid congestion. For the loss system of [26] it is shown that such
a schedule is in fact optimal in the case of a single server and no queue buffer, but suboptimal
for other systems. For more elaborate loss systems the equidistant schedule is used as a lower
bound for the optimal social welfare and PoA. Together with an upper bound obtained by an
oracle upper bound (that knows all service time realizations) the heuristic is shown to perform
well. Furthermore, this is used to show that the PoA is not monotone with the population size;
it is low for small populations because customers spread out by themselves in equilibrium, low
for large populations because the system is very congested for any schedule when the admission
interval is relatively shot and so there is little room for improvement, but for moderately sized
populations there is a big difference between the equilibrium and socially optimal outcome.
Generally speaking, the problem of social welfare optimization has less structure than that of
deriving the equilibrium arrival process for which we saw there is a common framework in many
of the papers. This means that typically adhoc analysis is required. For the model with tardiness
and earliness penalties, but no waiting costs, [14] show that the socially optimal solution is an
equilibrium (for most parameter sets), but it is not a unique equilibrium and so the price of
anarchy is still greater than one. In Ravner and Nazarathy [48] the socially optimal schedule for
the deterministic processor model of [47] is considered. The complex dynamics yield a piecewise
convex objective that can be maximized using an exhaustive algorithm that is only feasible
for a small number of customers. Heuristic methods are developed for the general problem.
Numerical analysis in [47] suggests that in equilibrium the deviation from the due dates is small
in comparison with the socially optimal solution but congestion levels are much higher.
5 Fluid approximations
Fluid models with determinsitc dynamics are widely used to approximate queueing systems
because they enable explicit derivation of performance measures and optimal policies. This is
especially true for time-dependent systems that cannot rely on steady-state results (see, for
example, Mandelbaum et. al [36]). The fluid approach has also been heavily used in the
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transpiration literature in the analysis of variations of the Vickrey bottleneck model (see [56, 4]).
Using our notation, the Vickrey model assumes the (α, β, γ) linear cost structure for waiting,
tardiness and earliness costs, respectively. Furthermore, as the motivation typically comes from
traffic networks composed of roads, it is assumed that the server is always available. In the
stochastic queueing setting similar assumptions to the ones made in [51] (which was discussed
in Section 3.4) are made. The latter also compared the fluid approximation of the equilibrium
profile to the stochastic counterpart without the restrictive assumptions often made in the
transportation literature (e.g. β > α > γ).
Fluid approximations in the context of when-to-arrive decision model were firstly introduced
by Jain et. al [29]. They turn out to be much easier to analyze (as expected), are shown
numerically to give good approximations and also lead to quick approximations to the price
of anarchy (PoA). Juneja and Shimkin [32] show that the equilibrium of the stochastic system
converges to the fluid solution as N → ∞. This result is unique in the sense that most papers
first assume a fluid model, sometimes also proving that the discrete system actually converges
weakly to the fluid system (e.g., Honnappa and Jain [27] and Honnappa et. al [28]), and then
derive the equilibrium of the game based on the fluid model.
Following the path of Section 3, we first provide a detailed description of the equilibrium so-
lution for Example 3, which considers homogeneous customers with linear waiting and tardiness
costs. Detailed analysis of this example appears in [29], [21] and [32]. This will be followed by a
review of additional literature that applied fluid models for approximating the equilibrium and
socially optimal solutions.
5.1 Fluid model of Example 3 (waiting and tardniess costs)
Fluid models make each customer tiny which can be considered as a drop in the ocean. Each
drop is served in no time. The original volume of the drops is fixed to some non-random value ∆,
and the server can serve µ of them per unit time. In particular, working continuously the server
can serve all demand in ∆/µ units of time. Also, a drop that finds a volume of δ upon its arrival
waits δ/µ units of time prior to service commencement (which is also its time of departure). An
intuitive explanation for the approximation of the stochastic system with a Poisson population
and exponential service times is as follows. Suppose that λ(m) and µ(m) are increasing and
unbounded sequences of arrival and service rates such that λ(m)/µ(m) = ∆/µ for all m ≥ 1, then
as m → ∞ we have an accelerated version of the stochastic system such that there is a huge
population of infinitesimally small customers that can all be processed in ∆/µ units of time.
The waiting and tardiness parameters are α and β, respectively, as before. Each drop needs
to decide when to arrive along the time interval T = (∞, T ] (randomization allowed) and in
this setting too a strategy defines a distribution over the possible arrival instants. Recall that
the server starts serving customers only at t = 0. Moreover, a symmetric Nash equilibrium
is such that given that all drops follow it, this is also a best response for an individual drop.
When it comes to social optimality, we assume that a central planner can dictate the arrival
time distribution which, due to the features of the fluid approximation model, is equivalent to
enforcing a specific (different) arrival instant on all. In other words, there is no distinction
between the full and the anonymous controls.
The first and biggest step in moving from the stochastic queueing model to the fluid model is
in observing that the amount of work in the system in the latter case is a deterministic process
. If the system is not empty during the arrival interval of customers [0, T ], which is obviously
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true for any equilibrium solution, then the queuing dynamics of (6) become now
Q(t) = ∆F (t)− µt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
for any symmetric arrival distribution. Furthermore, the waiting time for a drop arriving at t
is given by the deterministic process Q(t)/µ. In particular, recall that the equilibrium density
given in (15) depends on the probability of an idle server p0(t). For the fluid system p0(t) = 0
for all t ∈ [0, T ] and so the equilibrium condition simplifies greatly as there is no need to solve
elaborate dynamics such as the backward equations of the stochastic system. The equilibrium
arrival distribution turns out to be uniform, possibly with multiple intervals with different
densities.
Let us first consider the model where T < ∆/µ and early birds are allowed. We provide a
detailed outline of the analysis for this model and then summarize the results along with the
results of the other three variations on the two above assumptions (e.g., T ≥ ∆/µ and no early
birds, etc.). All cases can be handled in a similar manner and details can be found in [21]. For
simplicity, we assume below that both cost parameters, α and β are positive.
Let [−ta, 0] be the early bird period in equilibrium for some to-be-determined ta > 0. For
this time interval we have that the cost of arriving at t equals
−αt+ (α+ β)∆F (t)/µ,
which is constant in equilibrium. For t ≥ 0 the cost is
βt+ (α+ β)(∆F (t) − µt)/µ,
which equals the same constant. Thus, the equilibrium arrival distribution is uniform with
density
f(t) =
µ
∆
α
α+ β
, t ∈ [ta, T ].
The condition
∫ T
ta
f(t) dt = 1 further implies ta =
∆
µ
α+β
α
− T .
The disutility of the one who arrives at time −ta, which equals the disutility of all others, is
therefore α∆
µ
α+β
α
− T . Hence, the social cost in equilibrium is
∆(∆(α+ β)− αµT )/µ. (18)
As the server operates continuously from t = 0 until the system is empty the social planner has
no discretion over overall tardiness costs and therefore the socially optimal strategy minimizes
the waiting times by equating the arrival rate and the service rate for as long as possible, i.e.,
on the interval [0, T ]. Hence, the unique socially optimal arrival strategy is a uniform density
of µ/∆ along the interval [0, T ] and an atom of size 1 − µT/∆ at T . The corresponding social
cost equals
µβ
2
T 2 + (∆− µT )(βT +
∆− µT
2µ
(α+ β)). (19)
Those who arrive during [0, T ], a mass of µT , do not wait at all and, on average, each one of
them suffers a tardiness cost of βT/2. This contributes a total of βµT 2/2 to the social cost.
The rest, a mass of ∆ − µT , arrive at T . Each one of them suffers already a tardiness cost of
βT . On average, they clear the system after an additional time of (∆ − µT )/2µ with a cost of
α+ β per unit time of delay.
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Note that the PoA equals the ratio between (18) and (19). It is possible to see that when
α = 0 the PoA equals 2. Moreover, it increases with α and approaches the limit of ∆/(∆−µT )
(which is not a function of β) when α → ∞. Furthermore, the PoA goes to 2 when T goes
to zero or when it goes to ∆/µ. Also note that both the length of the arrival interval and the
density along it are not functions of T : Shrinking the arrival period after opening leads to drops
arriving earlier by the corresponding value. Finally and as expected, the length of actual arrival
period depends on the values of α and β only through their ratio.
We next summarize the results for all cases. It is clear from the above analysis that if
T ≥ ∆/µ then in fact there is no limitation and in equilibrium as well as under social optimality
customers anyway arrive prior to the closing time T .
1. The case with early birds and T ≤ ∆/µ.
If T ≤ ∆/µ then the unique equilibrium arrival strategy implies a density of µ∆
α
α+β along
the time interval [−∆
µ
α+β
α
+ T, T ]. The corresponding social cost equals ∆(∆(α + β) −
αµT )/µ. The unique socially optimal arrival strategy implies a uniform density of µ/∆
along the time interval [0, T ] and an atom of size 1−µT/∆ at T . The corresponding social
cost equals µβ2 T
2 + (∆− µT )(βT + ∆−µT2µ (α+ β)).
2. The case with early birds and T > ∆/µ.
The unique equilibrium arrival strategy implies a uniform density of µ∆
α
α+β along the
time interval [−∆β
µα
, ∆
µ
]. The corresponding social cost equals ∆2β/µ. The unique socially
optimal strategy implies a uniform density of µ∆ along the time interval [0,∆/µ] with a
social costs of ∆2β/2µ. In particular, the PoA equals 2. This result appears in [29].
3. The case without early birds.
Here we deal with the same fluid approximation model with one key difference: The
seniority of those who arrive prior to the opening time is not kept. In particular, all
those who arrive earlier enter service at random order. Thus, there is no point of arriving
before t = 0. We next give the details of the equilibrium strategy, distinguishing between
T ≥ ∆/µ and T ≤ ∆/µ. As in the discrete case, the corresponding distribution comes
with an atom at zero and then a gap with no arrivals until some time t′. From then on
until the last instant of possible arrivals, and as in the case with early birds, the density
in uniform. Finally, as of course arriving prior to opening was not part of the socially
optimal arrival strategy when it was allowed, the strategies detailed in the previous cases
are also socially optimal in this model. Finding the PoA is a simple exercise. Details are
given next for the two possible case.
(a) The case of T > ∆/µ.
If β ≥ α, the equilibrium strategy is pure and it prescribes arriving at opening. The
corresponding social cost is ∆2(α+ β)/(2µ) and the PoA = (α+ β)/β < 2. If β ≤ α
the equilibrium strategy is to arrive at zero with probability 2β/(α+β), then there is
a zero density (a gap) along the time interval (0, ∆β
αµ
) and a uniform density of µ∆
α
α+β
in the time interval [∆β
αµ
, ∆
µ
]. The corresponding social cost equals ∆2β/µ and the
PoA equals 2.
(b) The case of T ≤ ∆/µ.
In the case where β ≥ α the behavior is as described in (a). Assume next that
β < α. If T ≤ α+β2α
∆
µ
, then the equilibrium strategy is pure: all arrive at time zero.
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The resulting social cost equals ∆2 α+β2µ . Dividing this value by (19) yields the PoA. If
α+β
2α
∆
µ
< T < ∆
µ
, then the equilibrium is with an atom of size p = 2(1− αµT∆(α+β) ) at zero,
a zero density (a gap) along the time interval (0, t′) where t′ = p∆(α+β)2αµ =
∆(α+β)
αµ
−T
and a uniform density of (1− p)/(T − t′) along the interval [t′, T ]. As it turns out the
corresponding social cost coincides with the one given in (18). Likewise, the resulting
PoA is as in the case with early birds.
5.2 Overview of fluid models
As we have seen, the fluid dynamics enable explicit derivation of the equilibrium and socially
optimal arrival distributions. This can be further used to study more elaborate systems for
which even numerical methods for the computation of the equilibrium, such as Algorithm 1, are
out of reach. The fluid solution was also used as a benchmark solution in many of the papers
dealing with the discrete stochastic model that we have discussed so far (e.g., [21, 32, 26, 51, 49]).
Roughly speaking, the fluid equilibrium solution is indeed a good approximation for large systems
with small customers, but for small population games the equilibrium densities can be far from
uniform.
In many applications customers are not homogeneous in their utility functions or their service
demand. The models we have considered so far have all assumed homogeneous customers, with
the exception of [54] that assumes that customers have a random waiting cost that is determined
by a common distribution. Assuming that there are multiple customer types using the same
server makes the equilibrium analysis much harder. Consider Example 3 once more with P
customer types that have different linear waiting and tardiness costs (αi, βi) for i = 1, . . . , P .
Every type of customers now have different equilibrium conditions of the form of (9) and (10)
that keep the cost constant throughout the arrival support. Hence, the equilibrium arrival
profile is the solution of a system of functional differential equations that all have the same
underlying backward equations of the common queueing process. Studying the properties of
such a solution, e.g. existence and uniqueness, or even constrcting a numerical method that
always yields a solution is a challenging task and we are not aware of significance results in
these directions. Some of the difficulties associated with multiclass when-to-arrive games are
discussed in [49] for a model with service rate uncertainty. The fluid model enables analysis of
the equilibrium in multiclass games, as well as other more complex models such as non-FCFS
service regime and queueing networks.
The fluid version of the concert queueing game (Example 3) is studied in [29]. The equilib-
rium arrival profile dictates that different types of customers arrive on disjoint time intervals
with uniform densities that are determined by applying the same type of computations used in
Section 5.1. This is further used to obtain lower and upper bounds on the PoA. An extension
of the concert queueing game with multiple customer types, time-dependent service rate and
non-linear tardiness costs is considered in Juneja and Shimkin [33]. The form of the equilibrium
is similar with disjoint arrival intervals for the different types of customers but the equilibrium
dynamics are more elaborate, and thus the arrivals are not necessarily uniformly distributed.
It is further shown in [33] that a unique equilibrium exists and an efficient method to compute
it was presented. Juneja et. al [31] assume the fluid population volume is random (with a
single type of customers and constant capacity). In this case explicit analysis is possible but the
resulting equilibrium arrival density is uniform only on part of the support and decreases for
values higher than some threshold.
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So far we have dealt only with single-queue systems, i.e., even if there are multiple servers,
there is a common waiting buffer for all of them. The when-to-arrive game for a network of fluid
queues is considered by Honnappa and Jain [27]. Customers have linear waiting and tardiness
costs as before, but in a network setting there is additional question of routing. It is assumed
that routing is decentralized and so customers can choose both their arrival times and what
queue to join. First, the equilibrium arrival profile for a network of K parallel queues is derived.
The equilibrium arrival profile dictates that the flow of arrivals to each queue k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
is uniform on an interval [tk, T ], where tk < T for all k with tk < 0 for at least one k. The
PoA is further derived, similarly to Example 3, and is shown to be bounded by 2. Moreover,
the model is extended to multiple customer types that differ in the parameters of their linear
cost functions. As before, for the multiclass model in equilibrium the different types arrive in
specific queues on disjoint intervals. Finally, it is shown that certain more elaborate network
topologies, such as queues in tandem with a bottleneck structure, can be studied by showing
that they have an equivalent parallel network representation. Therefore, the results on parallel
networks can be applied directly to these more elaborate networks.
In Section 3.5 we discussed the difficulty in analyzing stochastic discrete systems with non-
FCFS service regime. However, these systems are common in many applications and can poten-
tially improve social welfare (as we have already discussed for several examples). A comparisson
of work conserving service regimes in a fluid setting appears in [44], with emphasis on FCFS
and LCFS. Their model assumes a fixed (population) volume of customers that are restricted
to arriving on [0, T ], linear waiting time costs, and general tardiness costs. It is shown that a
unique equilibrium arrival distribution exists for both FCFS and LCFS. The LCFS equilibrium
yields higher social welfare than the FCFS regime, and in fact FCFS yields the lowest social
welfare among all work-conserving service regimes.
A when-to-arrive game for a fluid processor sharing system with capacity µ and a volume
of ∆ arrivals is studied in Juneja and Raheja [30]. Note that processor sharing is equivalent in
this setting to random order of service. Customers have linear waiting and tardiness costs as
in Example 3. Clearly, in such a system customers never choose to be early birds and therefore
the arrivals start appearing at t = 0, and with an atom at zero. If there are no arrival time
restrictions, it is shown there that the equilibrium distribution is given by an atom of size β∆/µ
at time zero and a uniform density on (0,∆/µ]. The case of a finite closing time is also detailed
and follows similar arguments as in the corresponding case analyzed in Section 5.1.
An implicit assumption of all the models in this review was that customers have the ability
to arrive exactly at their chosen arrival time. This is of course not the case in many applications,
for examples when going to the bank or a concert there may be a positive variance in the travel
time from home (or work, etc.). This phenomenon was modeled by van Leeuwen et. al [55]
for a single server fluid queue with customers that have linear waiting, tardiness and earliness
costs. Specifically, customers choose their intended arrival time t but their actual arrival time
in the system is t + X where X is a random variable. It is shown that if X has a uniform
distribution, then there exists no equilibrium with a continuous mixed strategy. Furthermore,
neither does a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exist. Hence, a symmetric equilibrium has
to take the form of a distribution with several atoms, which is very different from all of the
models considered in this survey. The non-existence result for continuous distributions extends
to other non-uniform distributions of the arrival time distortion X. An alternative dynamic
agent-based logit decision model is suggested in [55] and is shown to converge to a stationary
distribution for some parameters of the problem, where stationarity is defined in the regular
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sense: if customers arrive according to the stationary distribution f on day d ∈ {1, 2, . . .} then
the logit induced distribution of arrival times on day d+ 1 is also f .
6 Discussion and open challenges
We have surveyed the growing body of literature dealing with arrival processes to stochastic
queueing systems that arise from strategic timing decisions of customers. The focus was on
the theoretical foundations of such models. In particular, we have discussed the construction of
appropriate mathematical models and the resulting properties of their solution concepts such as
Nash equilibrium and social welfare optimization. The motivation for the study of such models
comes from many daily activities that involve congested systems, however this research stream
has rarely devoted attention to the empicial study of real systems. Experimental laboratory
studies have examined the decision making of uncoordinated users in congested service systems
and have found that the ?/M/1 model predicts the aggregate empirical distribution very well
(e.g., Rapoport et. al [45] , Stein et. al [53] and Breinbjerg et. al [8]). It would also be interesting
to explore whether arrival data from actual service systems can be fitted with the ?/M/1 model.
Suppose for example that data is collected daily on the arrival process to a system that has
certain opening hours. The mean population size can be easily estimated by taking the average
daily total number of arrivals. The next step is to estimate the cost parameters of customers,
e.g., waiting cost α and tardiness cost β of Example 3. This can be achieved by evaluating the
empirical arrival rate at different times of the day and selecting as estimators the α and β that
minimize some loss function with respect to the distance between the equilibrium prediction
of the arrival rate and the empirical observations. Of course, there is also a model selection
problem here and for specific applications different models will have a better fit than others.
Developing statistical methodology seems like a natural research direction that compliments the
economic analysis that has been reviewed here.
There are certainly still many open questions in the theoretical analysis of when-to-arrive
games. This is especially true for more complex systems with various service regimes, hetero-
geneous customers or networks of queues. As we have seen, the direct analysis of the stochastic
system is very challenging and new methods are called for in order to make progress in this
direction. Furthermore, much insight has been gained by using fluid approximations, however,
in many cases the prediction of fluid models seems unsatisfactory. For example, in the multiclass
concert queueing game of [29] customers arrive at uniform rates on disjoint intervals but this
type of behavior is not plausible for many systems. As was detailed in Section 5.2, extending
this fluid model to allow for non-linear cost functions, random population size and network
structure yields equilibrium solutions with a more elaborate structure. Still a gap remains in
the equilibrium analysis of small scale multiclass systems with atmoic customers. One approach
that has potential to provide insight on the more elaborate stochastic systems is the dynamic
learning model of [50] discussed in Section 3.5. In terms of computation, one only needs to
be able to simulate the dynamics of the system in order to compute the equilibrium approxi-
mation. However, there are no theoretical guarantees yet that the learning dynamics converge
to an empirical distribution that is indeed a good approximation of the equilibrium solution.
Developing a rigorous framework for the learning dynamics, including asymptotic analysis and
error bounds on the approximation, would be very useful. This may be lead to a powerful tool
for approximating the equilibria in complex systems that are otherwise intractable.
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